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Peering through the lens of illegal charcoal production in the forested areas of 
Virunga National Park in eastern DR Congo, this paper makes a case for 
disaggregating the notion of “the state” to better capture “the political” in 
contemporary political forests. It argues that to identify the fluctuating importance of 
different dimensions of “stateness”, it is crucial to acknowledge the polymorphous 
socio-spatial relations that produce political forests. Thus, we draw on the notions of 
territory, place, scale and network (TPSN) to examine how “stateness” in Virunga has 
transformed under the particularization, transnationalization, and regionalization of 
authority. This approach allows us to show how these processes do not only stem 
from neoliberalization, but are also driven by, inter alia, regional warfare and non-
state militarization. The resulting complexity of the regulatory landscape turns 
Virunga into a space marked by a plurality of partly overlapping and partly 
conflicting political forests. 
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Political forests – a concept that relates to the socio-political dimension of the 
(re)production of land-use zones and species as “forests” (Vandergeest and Peluso 
2015) – are increasingly decoupled from the processes of the territorialization of state 
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authority that informed their genesis in many contexts globally (idem; Peluso and 
Vandergeest 2001). For Vandergeest and Peluso (2015), the growing salience of non-
state actors and processes constitutes the most recent, “fourth” moment in the 
historical evolution of political forests, entailing shifts in the modes and goals of 
forest management. This development away from predominantly state-controlled 
political forests parallels and converges with similar transformations in the domain of 
protected areas (PAs). A growing body of literature on neoliberal conservation 
describes how conservation practice is increasingly informed by the twin logics of 
deregulation and re-regulation (Castree 2008). These logics induce overlapping 
processes of de-territorialization, re-territorialization and re-scaling, through 
developments like marketization, decentralization, and outsourcing (Brockington et 
al. 2008; Igoe et al. 2010). The result is the rising influence of supra-national actors 
and institutions, like international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and bi- 
or multilateral aid donors, transforming PAs into transnationalized spaces (Igoe and 
Brockington 2007). 
 Looking through the lens of charcoal production in the forested areas of 
Virunga National Park, located in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
this paper demonstrates how these areas consist of multiple overlapping, intersecting 
and conflicting political forests, rather than a single political forest. Moreover, we 
show how the waning influence of central state authority within this plurality of 
political forests cannot uniquely be ascribed to neoliberalization. Rather, it is also a 
result of regional warfare, militarization involving non-state armed actors, and the 
rising regulatory influence of patronage networks and customary chiefs. These 
developments have transformed regulatory authority, contributing to its 
transnationalization, regionalization (indicating the scale of the Great Lakes Region 
herein), and particularization (or the growing imprint of particularistic rather than 
public logics). These processes can only be adequately captured by analytically 
disaggregating the notion of “the state”, which implies examining the variable role of 
different components of “stateness”. Such disaggregation, we argue, is facilitated by 
recognizing the “polymorphy” of Virunga’s political forests, or the organization of 
their “sociospatial relations in multiple forms and dimensions” (Jessop et al. 2008: 
390). This means studying at once territories, places, scales and networks (TPSN), an 
approach formulated by Jessop et al. (2008). 
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 Using the TPSN framework within the analysis of political forests helps 
examine what dimensions of stateness (e.g. regulatory, extractive and signifying 
capacities) are articulated in what ways within the multiple socio-spatial relations that 
constitute political forests. Focusing on multiple articulations of stateness, in turn, 
allows for going beyond dichotomous conceptualizations of state vs. non-state 
spheres. Additionally, it enables a finer-grained understanding of how the inhabitants 
of political forests engage in the “contentious co-production” (see Introduction to this 
special issue) of dominant regulatory arrangements. As we show, another advantage 
of adopting a polymorphous approach is that it facilitates unearthing the variegated 
processes driving the pluralization of political forests, which in the case of Virunga go 
beyond neoliberalization. As such, this approach promotes a better understanding of 
how neoliberalization interacts with other processes in producing regulatory 
transformations. It therefore helps identify the differential articulations of 
neoliberalisms in particular time-space contexts, or what Brenner et al. (2010) call 
“variegated neoliberalization”.   
 In respect of Virunga, the salience of neoliberalization in successive waves of 
regulatory restructuring has been uneven. While Structural Adjustment Programs 
(SAPs) played an important role in deregulation from the 1980s onwards–contributing 
to illegal charcoal production under the protection of park guards and other state 
actors–their effects were crucially mediated by the configuration of the Congolese 
state and its economic policies (Reno 1998). And while the resulting weakening of 
state regulatory capacities paved the way for warfare, in the end, regional geopolitics 
were instrumental to the outbreak of the First (1996–1997) and Second (1998–2003) 
Congo Wars (Lanotte 2003). These wars induced processes of re-regulation– in turn 
facilitated by forms of transnational deregulation enabling illicit financial and 
commodity flows– that rendered Congolese, Rwandan and other foreign state and 
non-state military figures crucial regulators of the charcoal trade (cf. Jackson 2006). 
This militarization, in turn, provided justifications for the privatization of Virunga’s 
management in the 2000s, which led to the transnationalization of the regulatory 
regimes surrounding charcoal (Marijnen 2018). In this manner, through indirect and 
incremental effects, and in interaction with other processes, structural adjustment 
ultimately contributed to promoting the privatization of the park. The example of 
Virunga thus shows how the cumulative impacts of successive waves of 
neoliberalism-driven transformations create pluriform “layering” effects (Brenner et 
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al. 2010: 189), entailing reconfigurations of authority that play out differently across 
places, territories and scales, as shaped by pre-existing regulatory landscapes.   
Our analysis draws on in total eight months of field research in the wider 
Virunga area focusing on authority patterns, conflict dynamics and the militarization 
of the political economy, including the charcoal sector (see Figure 1). To study the 
charcoal commodity chain, we interviewed producers, transporters, traders, taxing 
authorities, armed protectors, and charcoal consumers. Furthermore, we contacted 
park and other authorities, various types of security services, and local and 
international NGOs. We also analyzed discourses on charcoal diffused via news 
media and reports of NGOs and the United Nations (UN). To examine the evolution 
of regulatory arrangements, we also draw on earlier field research on the 
militarization of natural resources governance conducted in the eastern Congo 
between 2010 and 2016 (e.g. Marijnen 2017, 2018; Verweijen 2013, 2016). 
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. We first discuss the analytical 
pertinence of approaching political forests, stateness and neoliberalization as 
polymorphous phenomena. Next, we analyze the charcoal commodity chain in the 
Virunga area to trace the particularization, regionalization and transnationalization of 
regulatory authority. Subsequently, we draw on the TPSN framework to examine the 
uneven relevance of both central state authority and neoliberalization in the 
(re)production of Virunga’s plurality of political forests. We end by reflecting on the 
importance of disaggregating “the state” and studying the polymorphy of political 





Figure 1 Rough sketch of charcoal commodity chain in southern sector of Virunga National Park 
(sources: Schouten et al. 2017, ICCN and field research 2014–2017; disclaimer: this map does not 
claim to be exhaustive, only representing the main activities and locations; it is a snapshot of a volatile 
environment, implying it may not accurately reflect the current situation) 
 
 
The Polymorphousness of Political Forests, Stateness and Neoliberalization 
Within the field of political ecology, the notions of sovereignty, territory and “the 
state” are conceptualized in increasingly sophisticated manners, transcending previous 
monolithic understandings. Amongst other factors, this trend is a result of growing 
theoretical and empirical engagement with the neoliberalization and 
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transnationalization of nature conservation. For instance, both Corson (2011) and 
Büscher (2010) observe how a more pronounced role for foreign actors in PAs does 
not necessarily weaken, but may also strengthen certain registers of state power, and 
therefore intensify state territorialization. To explain this paradox, Lunstrum (2013) 
coins the term “articulated sovereignties”. This concept conceives of sovereignty as a 
set of attributes, competencies and powers that are articulated via complex 
interactions between and among intra-state, extra-state and non-state actors. These 
different components of sovereignty are “multiple, contingent, have different targets 
and spatialities, can potentially threaten one another, and may be gained by 
compromising other powers” (2013:2).  
Peluso’s (2018) notion of “entangled territories” captures a similar convoluted 
constellation of multidimensional relations between and among state and non-state 
actors. Owing to these entanglements, even in spaces where state authority is not 
dominant, the protagonists of territorialization may still “mimick state actors and 
enroll state institutions” (2018: 401), or be state actors involved in illegal practices 
not directed by central state institutions (see also Sikor and Lund 2009). In such cases, 
territorialization should be conceptualized as driven by emerging forms of 
governmentality that are constituted by a range of elements, notably: access and 
property relations, taxation practices, situated knowledges, forms of labor 
organization, and resource materialities and spiritualities (Peluso 2018). 
 The concept of entangled territories shows how, in a departure from its past 
predominant association with “the state” (Agnew 1994), territorialization is 
increasingly approached as a process that plays out via multi-scalar networks 
involving varying combinations of intra-state-, extra-state and non-state actors, logics, 
and practices (Peluso 2005). Accordingly, while still primarily articulated in the 
language of territorialization (e.g. Kelly 2015; Nel 2015a), the literature on PAs and 
political forests increasingly engages with network perspectives and the concept of 
scale (e.g. Li 2007; Zulu 2009). This pluralization of analytical tools is important, as 
it helps avoid  “methodological territorialism” (Jessop et al. 2008: 391)– which often 
leads to obscuring or misreading other socio-spatial processes, for instance, those less 
directly related to control. A singular focus on territorialization may for instance 
obliterate the affective dimensions of “stateness”, which are more readily uncovered 
when studying place-making.   
The term “stateness” was coined by Hansen and Stepputat (2001) to unpack 
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the notion of “the state”, which they see as having heterogeneous constituent 
components that should be analytically distinguished. These include regulatory 
authority, the idea of the state, bureaucracies, symbols, and state practices such as 
taxation. This theoretical approach draws on Mitchell’s (1991: 81) conceptualization 
of “the state” as a “structural effect” of entwined epistemological, discursive, and 
material processes that (re)produce state/society boundaries. This conceptualization 
suggests that, rather than approaching “the state” as a reified and monolithic whole 
with agency of its own, it should be seen as resulting from, and producing effects 
through, the interactions between entangled intra-state, extra-state and non-state 
actors and processes.  
Analytically disaggregating the state is a precondition for accurately grasping 
the effects of neoliberalization.  While it is clear that neoliberalization reconfigures 
state authority and its spatializiation (Ferguson and Gupta 2002), different elements of 
stateness might be affected differently across places, territories, and scales. To 
examine how this reconfiguration has unfolded in the Virunga area –where it has to a 
large extent been driven by other processes than neoliberalization– we will first trace 
the evolution of its regulatory landscape, focusing on charcoal. Subsequently, we 
draw on the TPSN framework to analyze the changing role of “central state 
authority”, herein considered a shorthand for authority exercised by the presidential 
patronage network, the central government, and the upper echelons of state agencies. 
 
Multi-layered Regulatory Landscapes Surrounding Charcoal 
The southern sector of Virunga National Park –a UNESCO world heritage site– is 
home to major old-growth forests (sclerophyll, tropical mountain and bamboo forests 
on volcano slopes). It is therefore commonly referred to, both by the Congolese 
Institute for Nature Conservation (ICCN) and the population, as “Virunga’s forest”, 
compared to the adjacent central sector with more open land habitat (e.g. savannahs). 
The southern sector is subject to increasing deforestation, which generates substantial 
negative environmental effects, such as land degradation and diminishing habitats for 
protected species like the mountain gorilla (Van de Giessen 2008). Deforestation is 
mostly the result of the clearing of land for pastoralism, especially in the area of the 
park adjacent to the territory of Masisi (see Figure 1) (Marijnen 2018). Yet it also 
stems from the production of charcoal, and the collection of firewood and wood for 
construction. 
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Most of the charcoal from the southern sector is sold to the more than one 
million inhabitants of the city of Goma, the capital of North Kivu province (UNSC 
2010). It was estimated that in 2006 (when having a population of only 550,000), the 
city consumed over 47,425 tons of charcoal, representing 285,500 tons (or 476,000m3) 
of wood. Charcoal is the main source of energy both for people living in Goma and 
around the park, with households burning about 840 kg (made from 5,040kg of wood) 
per household per year. That charcoal production requires such large amounts of 
wood is in part related to the unsophisticated nature of the kilns (piles of wood and 
earth under which tree branches are burnt), which do not reach very high temperatures 
(Languy et al. 2008). Aside from fuel, charcoal is also a crucial source of livelihood 
for thousands of people living in the park area – in some villages, as many as two 
thirds of the inhabitants depend on it for their income. Most of the production process, 
like tree felling and organizing the burning process in the kilns is carried out by young 
men who lack access to land and capital. Women, for their part, play a crucial role in 
transporting the sacks of charcoal out of the park. A part of this manual labor force 
consists of people who are internally displaced due to ongoing violence in the area. 
Yet charcoal provides income to many more people, including those selling and 
reselling charcoal at markets in villages around the park and in Goma. In addition, it 
yields benefits to “tax collectors” of various kinds, including armed forces, 
environmental and intelligence agencies and market authorities. 
The multilayered regulatory landscape surrounding charcoal is shaped by 
various factors, such as de jure and de facto property and access rights, the 
characteristics of the commodity and its chain, and the heavy militarization of the 
area. Access –whether to the park, the trees, the kilns, transport routes or markets– is 
to a large extent shaped by changing configurations of conflicting and colluding 
armed actors. These include park guards of the ICCN, which co-manages the park, 
members of the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and multiple Congolese and 
foreign armed groups. In exchange for granting access, these actors impose “taxes” on 
producers and transporters of charcoal, generally at roadblocks strategically located at 
charcoal traffic bottlenecks (Schouten et al. 2018). Some are also involved in 
organizing the production and transport of charcoal, often via civilian collaborators. 
Given that charcoal is bulky –it is usually sold per sack of 50kg, for between $7-30 
depending on the quality and point of sale– larger-scale transport occurs per big truck. 
In some cases, these trucks are owned by the army, which is advantageous as military 
vehicles are exempted from taxation (UNSC 2010; Schouten et al. 2018). 
Both the production of charcoal –due to the smoke emanating from the kilns– 
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and its transportation are difficult to hide and therefore easy to tax. The illegal status 
of the commodity chain renders the sector further vulnerable to taxation, since it 
provides state agents with the discretionary power to disallow the activity (Verweijen 
2013). Yet while its production is illegal, the trade in charcoal from the park is 
generally not seen as illicit. Not only is the commodity itself considered a basic need, 
the lack of livelihood opportunities and the contested status of the park cause many to 
view charcoal production as justified (cf. Verweijen and Marijnen 2018). In addition, 
the widespread involvement of state agents and the relatively open nature of the trade 
help further normalize and legitimize it. However, as we show in the following 
overview of the regulatory landscape surrounding charcoal, the involvement of state 
agents should not be equated with state regulation. 
 
The Regionalization of Authority  
Several of the armed groups that are (or used to be) major players in the charcoal 
trade originate from, or are closely linked to, ruling elites in Rwanda. These regional 
influences are in part the outcome of a long history of territorial contestation. Before 
the colonial period, certain Rwandan kings exercised relatively strong, albeit 
fluctuating, influence over the Bwisha area now adjacent to the park (in the Congo). 
The population there is from the same groups (Hutu and Tutsi) and speaks the same 
language as in Rwanda (Kinyarwanda) (Fairhead 2005). Throughout the colonial and 
postcolonial eras, this history of influence has fed into territorial claims and 
interference, including two military invasions in the 1990s (Mathys 2017). Yet the 
first invasion in 1996 was mostly related to the threat posed by Rwandan refugee 
camps along the Congo-Rwanda border, which hosted hundreds of thousands of Hutu 
refugees as well as combatants of the former Rwandan government forces and militias 
implicated in the genocide against Tutsi in 1994. Some of these refugee camps were 
located in Virunga National Park or its buffer zones, allowing their inhabitants to 
collect forest products both for their own use and as a commercial activity. The result 
was rapid deforestation, proceeding at a rate of 7,000-10,000m3 a day (Biswas and 
Tortajada-Quiroz 1996). 
The ex-Rwandan armed forces and militias in the camps –which later formed 
the rebel force Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)– soon 
reorganized themselves militarily, launching cross-border raids to dislodge the new 
Tutsi-dominated government in Rwanda. To stop this menace and overthrow the 
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president of the Congo (then named Zaire), accused of facilitating the Hutu forces’ 
military reorganization, Kigali mobilized a mixed regional-Congolese insurgency in 
1996, which took over the country in only seven months. This insurgency forcibly 
dismantled the camps and killed tens of thousands of Hutu refugees in Virunga’s 
forests (Lanotte 2003). Until today, as one interviewee argued, the area is considered 
by some not primarily as a national park but as one large graveyard (interviews, May 
2015). 
 Discontent with the new Congolese regime, Rwanda and its ally Uganda 
initiated a new rebellion in 1998, which unleashed the Second Congo War. During the 
war, the southern sector of Virunga was occupied by a rebel force commanded by the 
Rwandan army, which was closely linked to (mostly Tutsi) Rwandan political and 
economic elites. In 2003, after the adoption of a peace accord, the Virunga area 
formally passed from rebel to central state control. Yet, after the withdrawal of the 
Rwandan army, Rwandan influence over the eastern Congo continued via 
intermediaries, in particular the Tutsi-dominated Congolese rebel group National 
Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). This group claimed to protect the 
Congolese Tutsi population both against the distrusted Congolese army (FARDC) and 
the FDLR, which was strongly supported by Rwandan Hutu networks in the region 
and in Europe (UNSC 2011). These three military actors (FARDC, FDLR, and 
CNDP) were for a long period the main players in the charcoal business. They 
constantly clashed and colluded, not only with each other but also with the manifold 
smaller armed groups (often named “Mai-Mai”) that continue to operate in the park. 
This complex pattern of more or less negotiated, differentiated territorial control 
between different armed forces–now also including ICCN rangers–persists until 
today. As a young man in Rusayo explained about the makala (charcoal) chain: 
 
The ICCN arrive here sometimes, they are not based here because of the 
presence of the FDLR in the park 10–20 kilometers from here (…). Between the 
production [site] of the makala and the final market there are three barriers, the 
people that produce makala pay a tax to the FDLR, the people that transport the 
makala first to the police, and later on again to [FARDC] soldiers at road blocks 
(interview, June 2015). 
 
  Given the FDLR and the CNDP’s embedding in networks stretching into the 
Great Lakes Region, power plays between regional elites and their local allies 
strongly impact regimes of access to the charcoal trade. For instance, in the area of the 
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park bordering Masisi territory, along the Kingi-Kitchanga axis, there is a large Tutsi 
population who arrived in 2003 and later remained under the protection of the CNDP. 
In 2008, the rebel group sharply expanded its presence in the park with the backing of 
elements in the Rwandan government, prompting the ICCN to negotiate with them to 
guard access to the sector that hosts the mountain gorillas (see Figure 1). To maintain 
good relations, the ICCN –which now included “CNDP-friendly rangers” (Wikileaks 
2008)– did not address the rebels’ presence in the park in Masisi, where they engaged 
in charcoal production and cleared land for large-scale cattle-ranching and human 
settlement. Many of the ranches then built are owned by businesspeople and 
politicians with strong ties to Rwandan elites, evidencing the regionalization of the 
regulatory regime surrounding charcoal.  
In 2009, the CNDP became part of the Congolese army (FARDC), which 
further circumscribed the possibilities for law enforcement in the Masisi part of the 
park. Negotiating from a position of military strength, the CNDP managed to 
constitute itself as a parallel power network within the FARDC, while remaining 
closely related to its former Rwandan backers. Moreover, the group used its position 
within the Congolese army to conduct military operations against the FDLR, at times 
with the support of Virunga’s park guards, which allowed them to take over many 
charcoal protection rackets (UNSC 2011). Given the CNDP’s de facto autonomous 
status in the army, these operations did not contribute to extending central state 
authority over the park. Rather, they reinforced a regime of access to the park and its 
resources where those with links to Rwandan elites were favored, creating 
competition and conflicts between the FARDC and the park authorities (UNSC 2010). 
Furthermore, its leadership being dominated by Tutsi, the ex-CNDP’s military 
dominance reinvigorated long-running inter-group tensions throughout the eastern 
Congo, which equally impacted regimes of access (Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen 
2013). 
 
The Particularization of Authority 
Within the Congo, both political and armed mobilization occur to an important extent 
along ethnic lines (Verweijen 2016). While the primary support base of the CNDP 
was the Tutsi community, (Congolese) Hutu populations have generally closer ties to 
the FDLR and Nyatura armed groups. The Nande, for their part, are the primary 
constituency of different Mai-Mai groups in the Virunga area. Due to the ethnicized 
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nature of armed mobilization, the territorialization of charcoal protection rackets 
intersects with the territorialization of ethnicity. This latter process originated in the 
colonial era, when the colonizers set out to create territorially fixed “ethnic 
homelands” ruled by customary chiefs (Muchukiwa 2006). The result was a 
“bifurcated state” (Mamdani 1996) where customary authorities were state-
recognized local authorities, but operated under customary law. This system continues 
to be in place today, introducing a complex layeredness to state authority at the local 
level. 
 While the land on which Virunga National Park is located formally belongs to 
the Congolese state, chiefs consider themselves to be the customary owners of what 
they regard as their ancestral grounds, therefore rejecting state ownership. Chiefs have 
also been at the forefront of contestations of the park’s limits, including by allowing 
people to live and exploit resources within the park (Vikanza 2018). Since the trees 
from which makala is made are located on “their” land, chiefs feel entitled to tax its 
production and trade. According to the population of Rusayo, these revenues push the 
chief of Bukomo “to close his eyes [to the charcoal trade].” The chief justifies his 
stance by arguing that the ICCN does not respect the original agreement between the 
colonial administration and his forefathers, forcing him to seek other means of 
income. This agreement stipulated that in exchange for ceding their lands, the eleven 
customary chiefs in the Virunga area would gain an equal share of the revenues of 
authorized fishing within the park (mostly on Lake Edward). In part owing to the 
forms of ethnic territorialization resulting from rebel occupation, this system does not 
work anymore. As the chief states: 
 
our Nande friends [including the Mai-Mai groups protecting illegal fishing] 
completely appropriated the fisheries around Lake Edward and do not share 
the fish equally (…) The convention we concluded does not work anymore, 
we cannot go there anymore, I would risk getting killed. The ICCN should 
reconsider the convention, because now people encroach on the park for 
makala (interview, June 2015).   
 
The prominence of chiefs linked to particular ethnic constituencies contributes 
to the particularization of authority, or the growing imprint of particularistic rather 
than public logics on its exercise. A similar process takes place where state agents act 
more in the service of patronage networks than of their administrative hierarchies. 
Given that within patronage systems, loyalty is exchanged for access to resources, this 
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form of particularization generally reinforces state agents’ involvement in revenue 
generation (Bayart 2006). While already pronounced, the imprint of patronage 
networks on the workings of the state increased from the 1970s onwards, when state 
resources dried up due to a combination of economic crisis, bad economic 
management and SAPs. As the real wages of state agents drastically dropped, 
President Mobutu Sese Seko encouraged them to “fend for themselves” by means of 
pilferage, extortion and other forms of power abuse and predation (Reno 1998). In 
relation to PAs, this encouragement led rangers to become involved in illegal natural 
resources exploitation, including of charcoal (Vikanza 2018). 
After the Congo Wars, the workings of the state apparatus have continued to 
be shaped by rationalities of patronage and revenue generation (Verweijen 2013). 
This generates complex patterns of conflict and collusion between different state 
services and rebel forces all vying for resources. For instance, at an illegal charcoal 
market in the park called Karenga, where the ICCN does not go, the rebels of the 
FDLR, the Congolese army and police, and the official Congolese tax authority are 
present simultaneously to impose taxes. While the army demands 500 francs 
congolais (FC, equaling USD 0.3) per bag of makala, the tax authority levies 5,000FC 
per “official” market stall per week. While collected by Congolese state actors, this 
money does not necessarily flow into the state coffers, even though parts of it are 
transferred to higher levels of the hierarchy. Most Congolese state agencies are 
characterized by systems of rapportage, whereby money generated at lower levels is 
transmitted to higher levels, following the contours of patronage networks. To 
maximize revenues, such networks attempt to influence their members’ zones of 
deployment, for instance, trying to ensure that loyal army commanders are stationed 
in charcoal production areas (UNSC 2010; Verweijen 2013). Consequently, even 
while involving state actors, access to charcoal production and its revenues becomes 
largely shaped by particularized forms of authority. 
 
The Transnationalization of Authority 
The imprint of non-state logics on Congolese state actors’ practices can also be 
detected among the ICCN, which is strongly guided by its foreign sponsors. Over the 
past decade, the latter have gained growing influence over the park, mirroring the 
heavy transnational involvement in the colonial era (De Bont 2017). Transnational 
influence became particularly pronounced when the European Commission, the 
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park’s largest donor, put pressure on the Congolese government to conclude a public 
private partnership (PPP) that incrementally transferred the responsibility for the 
park’s management to a British NGO, the Virunga Foundation (Marijnen 2017). 
Hence, following textbook patterns of the neoliberalization of nature conservation, 
transnationalization went hand in hand with privatization (Brockington et al. 2008; 
Igoe et al. 2010). 
The new park management and its transnational support network heavily 
invest in addressing what they label the “charcoal crisis”. This course of action is 
justified by two predominant discourses, which are diffused by the park’s publicity 
campaigns and international media and INGO reporting. The first portrays makala as 
a “conflict resource” that is a main cause for the mobilization of armed groups, as 
reflected in its dramatic description as “black gold” (e.g. Mbugua 2016). According to 
a recent report of the US-based lobby and advocacy NGO The Enough Project, 
entitled The Mafia in the Park, “illegal charcoal is a centerpiece of the criminal 
business network in eastern Congo”, run “by one of the region’s most established and 
enduring armed militias (the FDLR)” (Dranginis 2016: 5). The second discourse, 
reflecting Neomalthusian strands of environmental security thinking, depicts charcoal 
as “unsustainable” in the light of “population pressure” and “scarcity”. As a 2008 
report named Charcoal in the Mist states: 
 
The combination of a high and rising population density, the strong reliance 
on resources and the enormous need for energy in the form of firewood and 
charcoal, all lead to a very high pressure on the natural resources in this region 
(Van de Giessen 2008: 13). 
 
These discourses attract and shape multiple internationally sponsored 
interventions to stop the charcoal trade. In addition, they inform the park 
management’s efforts to push armed groups involved in the trade out of the park via 
military operations with mixed battalions of ICCN rangers and FARDC soldiers 
(Verweijen and Marijnen 2018). While the rangers of the ICCN are technically 
Congolese state agents, their commander in chief is the (Belgian) director of the 
Virunga Foundation. Moreover, they are trained by private security contractors 
including former Belgian paratroopers, and receive allowances, transport and 
equipment financed by foreign donors (Marijnen 2017). This embedding in 
transnational networks influences their discourses and practices. For instance, it leads 
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them to frame and approach the population in places like Rusayo as “enemies of the 
park”, because they are intermingled with the FDLR or other rebel groups 
(interviews, June 2014). Despite this, many inhabitants, especially those depending on 
charcoal for their livelihood, continue to collaborate with armed groups. As a man in 
Rusayo stated: 
 
We had a good collaboration with the FDLR (…) and because they cannot 
leave the forest, we carried the bags on our back from the park to our village, 
and then it gets transported to Goma (…) You need to work together with the 
enemy if it is your neighbor (interview, June 2015).  
 
Civilian collaborators complicate efforts of the mixed ICCN-FARDC battalions to 
“reconquer” rebel-held areas, as they withhold information on rebel movements, and 
help rebel groups return to areas they were dislodged from (Verweijen and Marijnen 
2018). In this way, the population plays a crucial role in military struggles to regulate 
the charcoal trade, further illustrating how regimes of access to Virunga’s forests are 
shaped by contentious co-production. 
 The inhabitants of the Virunga area are also crucial for the success of INGO 
efforts to curb the charcoal trade. To change charcoal consumption patterns, INGOs 
try to transform people’s attitudes and promote the development of alternative sources 
of fuel, but with limited success. An alternative fuel project initiated by the Virunga 
Foundation in 2008 –the production of biomass briquettes– was, in the words of an 
INGO employee “a complete failure also because it did not take the cooking culture 
and traditions into account” (interview, July 2014). The briquettes produced a lot of 
smoke and had a relatively short burning period, rendering them unable to warm up 
cooking pots for a longer period of time. The World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) 
subsequently initiated another project, called EcoMakala, which promotes tree 
planting on small plots of land located close to the park, in cooperation with local 
associations. A part of the trees is destined for making makala, another part for the 
production of sticks and planks, while in the future another part should receive carbon 
credits in the framework of REDD+. Similar to the briquettes project, EcoMakala –
currently covering over 9,000 hectares of planted trees–overlooks the complexities of 
the charcoal market. Crucially, the charcoal it yields– locally known as makala 
biwerewere (“idiots’ charcoal”) (UNSC 2017)– is of significantly lower quality than 
ndobo, the longer-burning charcoal from old-growth trees in the park. It is made from 
 16 
eucalyptus trees, which are non-indigenous to the area, and negatively affect soil and 
water quality (Stanturf et al. 2013). Refusing to inhabit the ascribed environmental 
subject positions, people in Goma continue to buy ndobo at around USD 25–30 per 
bag, despite EcoMakala costing much less: approximately USD 15 per bag at the 
market and USD 7 at the plantation (field notes, May 2017). 
To remedy this, WWF tried to convince the Congolese government to 
significantly raise the taxes imposed on makala from the park to push the price further 
up (interview, May 2014). This effort by a transnational actor to shape the regulatory 
practices of Congolese state agents led to a conflict with another part of the state 
apparatus that is equally under transnational influence, namely, the ICCN. According 
to the chief warden of the southern sector: “EcoMakala is not a good project (…). 
They work with people who do not collaborate with us [the ICCN] and who do not 
respect the park” (interview, June 2013). It follows that the transnationalization of 
authority is not a monolithic process, as it involves multiple players that are often in 
competition. 
What further hampers the EcoMakala project is that illegal makala production 
in the park offers far more people an income than EcoMakala, which benefits mostly 
the landowner. Moreover, only farmers with a minimum of 0.5 hectare of officially 
registered land can participate, thus excluding many of the youngsters involved in 
makala production. Another problem is that WWF imposes very strict criteria, and if 
farmers do not comply, their contract is broken. Due to rampant insecurity in the area, 
planted trees are sometimes stolen or destroyed, causing farmers to miss out on their 
income. Many of the local associations involved therefore question the way the 
EcoMakala project is run. Yet they believe they cannot change it as they are not equal 
partners. An external evaluation of the project similarly concluded that WWF –aside 
from being allocated 54 percent of the project budget while local associations receive 
five percent – does not genuinely work together with or transfer responsibilities to 
these associations (Bouyer et al. 2013). Hence, where international conservation 
NGOs are involved, the contentious co-production of regulatory authority occurs on a 
decidedly un-level playing field.  
 
Territory, Place, Scale and Network in (Re)making Political Forests 
As this brief overview of the evolution of the regulatory landscape surrounding 
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charcoal shows, authority in Virunga’s forests is shaped by interactions between a 
multitude of intra-, non-, and extra-state actors, who are embedded in multi-scalar 
networks. These conflicting and collaborating actors have divergent relations to and 
discourses on charcoal and Virunga’s forests more generally, as shaped by, inter alia, 
worldviews, feelings of belonging, livelihood needs, and military dynamics. It follows 
that Virunga’s forested area can better be conceptualized as constituted by a multitude 
of diverse political forests, rather than a single political forest. The polymorphous 
socio-spatial relations constituting this plurality of forests are unevenly shaped by 
different dimensions of “stateness”. Below, we further examine this unevenness by 
drawing on Jessop et al.’s (2008) TPSN framework. For lack of space, we cannot go 
deeply into the conceptual discussions around this framework’s components, which 
we consider not competing, but complementary and overlapping perspectives (cf. 
Paasi 2008; van Meeteren and Bassens 2016). 
 
Territory 
Articulating with Painter’s (2010) approach to territory as an effect of sociotechnical 
practices, Elden (2010) identifies three inter-related dimensions of the processes that 
(re)produce this effect; political-economic, political-strategic, and political-
technological. Complementing these dimensions, Paasi’s (1991) discussion of 
regionalization highlights what may be termed a “political-symbolic” dimension of 
territorialization, relating to the forms of identification surrounding territory, and how 
these are anchored in and give meaning to everyday life. In respect of political forests, 
these four dimensions take on the following shape: The political-economic dimension 
centers on defining and controlling access to the ownership and use of land and forest 
resources, which often involves processes like enclosure and dispossession 
(Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). The political-strategic perspective, in turn, relates to 
forests as a terrain where insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are staged, which 
deeply affect control over land, resources and populations (Peluso and Vandergeest 
2011). The political-technological dimension is constituted by techniques of scientific 
forest management, such as zoning, demarcation, and codifying access and user rights 
in legislation (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Neumann 1998). Finally, the political-
symbolic perspective focuses on the ways forest spaces are identified and given 
meaning, for instance, as “national parks” (Jazeel 2005) or as “forests” rather than 
“jungles” (Peluso and Vandergeest 2011). 
 18 
In the case of Virunga, we observe that in none of these four dimensions, the 
Congolese central state is hegemonic. Starting with the political-economic dimension, 
we observe that access to the means and profits of charcoal production and trade is 
contested by various armed forces and related civilian networks. Even where 
Congolese state actors are influential, they are not necessarily directed by their 
official hierarchy in Kinshasa nor do the revenues they make from charcoal –by 
breaking the law– necessarily flow to that hierarchy. Instead, authority and resources 
are largely channeled through patronage networks. Following this general pattern, the 
army too is riddled with multiple competing power networks (Verweijen 2018). 
Consequently, counterinsurgency operations –relating to territory as terrain– do not 
always contribute to the extension of central state authority. The same applies to law 
enforcement operations by the externally trained, funded and commanded ICCN 
rangers, which mostly reinforce the control of the Virunga Foundation.  
The political-technological dimension of territorialization is equally marked 
by a high level of transnationalization: even while drawing on Congolese state 
legislation and state actors like the ICCN, it is INGOs such as the Virunga Foundation 
and WWF that have predominant influence on the scientific management of 
Virunga’s forests and inhabitants, for instance by zoning tree production sites. 
Looking at the fourth, political-symbolic-dimension of territory, we see no clear-cut 
dominance of the central state either.  The meanings of Virunga’s forests projected by 
the central state, which portrays Virunga as “national park/patrimony”, are 
continually contested. Rejecting state ownership of land, customary chiefs and their 
constituencies see Virunga’s territory primarily as their ancestral grounds, leading 
them to speak of “our forests”. Informally, Rwanda’s ruling elites also contest the 
significations propagated by the Congolese state. They see Virunga not so much as a 
(Congolese) “national park”, but as a (historical) sphere of their own influence and 
site of justified intervention (Mathys 2017), in part owing to the presence of the 
FDLR. Paradoxically, even actors linked to the Congolese state diffuse meanings that 
reflect limited state control. For instance, FARDC soldiers involved in 
counterinsurgency operations often speak of Virunga as “forest” in the sense of 
“bush” (pori or forêt /brousse), which indicates the presence of rebel forces 
(interviews, January 2012). Hence, broadly similar to the ways in which the 
territorialization of ethnicity is reinforced by ethnicized armed group control, 
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historical territorial imaginaries and current forms of military occupation interact in 
shaping the political-symbolic form of Virunga’s forests as territory. 
 
Place 
Territory overlaps in several aspects with place, here seen as “an historically 
contingent process” (Pred 1984). Following Agnew, place is considered to have three 
main dimensions: The first is locale, or “the settings for everyday, routine social 
interaction provided in a place”, constituting its “structured microsociological 
content” (1987: 5). Political forests as locale are constituted by the everyday micro-
practices and interactions of forest dwellers, users and governors, and how these 
practices and relations shape and are shaped by macro-structures, like nation-state 
frameworks. The second dimension of place is location, referring to the embedding of 
locales within physical settings (Agnew 1987: 27). In relation to political forests, 
location, such as proximity to international borders, affects the ways they are framed 
and governed (cf. Lunstrum 2014). A good example is transfrontier conservation 
spaces labeled “peace parks”, reflecting how transboundary management supposedly 
fosters regional stability (Büscher 2010). The third dimension of place is sense of 
place, or the subjective orientation toward place that is engendered through everyday 
practices (Agnew 1987: 27). In this respect, Massey (1994) stresses the importance of 
power/knowledge relations that render certain meanings of place visible while 
obscuring others. While some senses of place attached to political forests are therefore 
more conspicuous than others, they generally continue to be highly diverse: forests 
may, for instance, be seen as dangerous places, as places of production, as ancestral 
heritage or as spiritual environment (Neumann 1998). 
One way to study Virunga’s forests as locale is to look at micro-practices of 
charcoal production and taxation, and how these are guided by routines, norms, 
beliefs and people’s sense of entitlement to forest resources (cf. Sikor and Lund 
2009). These various elements are in turn shaped by people’s sense of place, which 
varies among different groups. Among large parts of the population, Virunga’s forests 
instill a sense of danger, stemming from memories of massacres and the presence of 
multiple armed actors. Yet a sense of Virunga may also bear ethnic and ancestral 
connotations that are (re)produced by everyday practices, like the taxation of charcoal 
by customary chiefs (Verweijen and Marijnen 2018). Even for displaced populations, 
who do not live on their ancestral grounds, Virunga’s forests are often ethnicized 
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spaces, as host populations and armed forces frame displaced people in terms of their 
ethnic origins (interviews, 2015–2017). Furthermore, for many of the poor who lack 
access to land, Virunga’s forests and entitlements to their resources are primarily seen 
in terms of survival. As one man in Rusayo commented: 
  
We are like fishermen, who need to stay close to the water, we need to stay in 
the park. Even before the FDLR arrived we made charcoal, and if they are 
gone, we will continue with the trade and the FARDC will help us to do so 
(interview, June 2015).  
 
As this quote indicates, while the idea of “the state” continues to occupy a central role 
in imaginaries of socio-political order in the eastern Congo (Hoffmann and 
Vlassenroot 2014), for certain groups, it may be relatively irrelevant whether an area 
is controlled by state or non-state forces at the level of everyday practice. This relative 
indifference is reinforced by the location of Virunga far (over 1500 kilometers) from 
Kinshasa, and people’s overall weak political and economic ties to the capital, which 
cannot be reached overland due to poor road infrastructure. These thin connections to 
the capital stem from and feed into a strong orientation towards the local region, 
including the other side of the border (Jackson 2006). 
 
Scale 
Following Swyngedouw (1997: 169), we see scale as “the embodiment of and the 
arena through which social relations of empowerment and disempowerment operate”. 
The boundaries of these arenas are socially produced via contingent processes of 
structuration that are partly shaped by capitalist relations, therefore being both “fluid” 
and “fixed” (Smith 1992). The analytic of scale has been employed in analyses of 
political forests and PAs in a variety of ways, of which we will discuss here only a 
few. Focusing on forest governance in Uganda, and how it has been affected by 
neoliberalization, Nel (2015a) describes processes of “upscaling”, reflecting the 
growing policy influence of supra-state entities like the World Bank; “outscaling”, 
relating to the increasing salience of the private sector and market-based 
configurations; and “downscaling”, or the decentralization of governance structures. 
 We see roughly similar processes at work in Virunga’s political forests, as 
partly driven by neoliberalization. Processes of “upscaling” go hand in hand with 
“outscaling”, as reflected for instance in the European Commission’s pressure on the 
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Congolese government to devolve the park’s management to a PPP. This partnership 
has opened the door to a profound influence of market rationalities and parties on the 
park’s management and financing (Marijnen and Verweijen 2016). Market 
rationalities also imprint INGO initiatives to curb charcoal production, as reflected in 
WWF’s plan to designate a part of the EcoMakala forests for REDD+. “Downscaling” 
has in part taken the form of the “particularization” of authority, whereby customary 
chiefs contest or ignore national authorities and legislation, like the boundaries of the 
park. Yet it has also occurred through transnational actors’ harnessing of local NGOs 
to implement projects like EcoMakala. For their part, such local “intermediaries” 
often engage in “scale jumping” (Smith 1992), bypassing Congolese state actors to 
deal directly with INGOs in order to access their resources and reshape their projects. 
Processes of up–, out–and down-scaling have not rendered the nation-state 
scale irrelevant. Through legislation, regulations, and the presence of state actors, the 
framework of the nation-state shapes the interactions that (re)produce other scales. 
Additionally, the nation-state figures as an important “scalar narrative”, articulating 
agency and (de)legitimizing paths of action  (cf. Taravella and De Sartre 2012: 645). 
For instance, even though their own influence undermines the Congolese state’s 
regulatory authority, transnational actors frame Virunga’s forest explicitly as a 
Congolese state space. Thus, for the park’s Belgian chief warden, law enforcement 
operations that reinforce the authority of the (transnationally managed) Virunga 
Foundation lead to “the restoration of state institutions” and “the rule of law” 
(Dranginis 2016: 26). Congolese state agents, in turn, portray Virunga’s forests 
explicitly as “state/national space” to legitimize their claims to authority or resources, 
emphasizing that they are national officials upholding the state dominated order 
(Marijnen 2018). However, due to the particularization of state authority, these scalar 




Networks can be conceptualized in multiple ways: herein we approach them as socio-
spatial abstractions that foreground interconnectivity, and thus primarily as 
epistemological, rather than ontological categories (cf. van Meeteren and Bassens 
2016). In respect of political forests, network perspectives have for instance been 
employed in the form of analytics of assemblage (Li 2007; Nel 2015b). Yet here we 
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focus on another type of network approach, namely, the analysis of commodity chains 
of forest products. Commodity chain analysis entails examining the interconnections 
between actors at different scales by mapping access to means of production and 
revenues, as well as the claims to such access (Ribot 1998). In this way, it provides 
detailed insight into regulatory regimes. When applied to charcoal in Virunga’s 
forests, commodity chain analysis foregrounds the links and blurred boundaries 
between state and non-state, civilian and military actors, who both fight over and 
agree upon particular divisions of labor, territory and revenues. Yet to fully grasp the 
complexity of commodity chains, and the practices of the different actors involved, 
one also needs to examine the wider social networks into which these actors are 
embedded, which channel flows of resources, information, authority and discourses. 
 As emerges from the previous, studying the social networks of actors in the 
Virunga area reveals the transnationalization, regionalization and particularization of 
regulatory authority. Looking at armed forces, we see that many of the rebel groups 
involved in the Second Congo War had strong regional links, for instance with 
Rwandan elites. Others, often through the trade in minerals and hardwood, also had 
important transnational connections (Lanotte 2003). The continued existence of these 
multi-scalar relations renders a conceptualization of the protracted violence in the 
eastern Congo in terms of Duffield’s (2002) “war as a network enterprise” 
analytically accurate. For Duffield, the emergence of these war networks was enabled 
by global financial and economic deregulation in the post-Cold-War era. These 
regulatory transformations facilitate illicit money and commodity flows, which in turn 
allow rebel groups and state actors alike to obtain arms and resources.  
Today, many armed actors, like the FDLR, continue to be embedded in multi-
scalar networks, although in the case of the government forces, these are more heavily 
oriented towards the national scale. Like other state actors, FARDC personnel is part 
of patronage networks that crosscut and overlap with the official military hierarchy. 
These networks infuse different parts of the FARDC, which provokes conflicts and 
competition within the military (Verweijen 2018). For instance, when the ICCN 
started its collaboration with the FARDC in 2010, this provoked a backlash among 
other parts of the army involved in illegal resources exploitation, such as the navy, 
leading to armed confrontations (UNSC 2010). This example shows how mapping the 
networks of which state agents form part helps analyze “the state” in a disaggregated 
manner, which enables a more accurate analysis of the salience of its various 
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components across different political forests. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
Looking at the regulatory landscape surrounding charcoal produced in the forested 
areas of Virunga National Park, this paper highlights the need to analytically 
disaggregate “the state” in order to grasp the complexities of the fourth moment in the 
historical evolution of political forests, away from central state domination. 
Moreover, it demonstrates how such disaggregation is facilitated by recognizing the 
polymorphy of the socio-spatial relations that (re)produce political forests. A 
polymorphous and disaggregated approach, in turn, allows for better identifying the 
drivers of the variegated salience of stateness, and how this variation shapes and is 
shaped by processes of de-and re-regulation. In the case of Virunga, these drivers are 
only partly related to neoliberalization, although –in interaction with other processes– 
the latter did play an important role in setting in motion successive waves of 
regulatory transformations. 
Neoliberalism, notably in the form of SAPs, was one of a complex mix of 
ingredients that intensified the particularization of authority from the end of the 1970s 
onwards. The resulting weakening of central state control over lower echelons of the 
state apparatus and peripheral regions laid the foundation for successive wars in the 
1990s and early 2000s (Reno 1998). These wars were partly triggered by competing 
projects of Congolese and Rwandan state territorialization, and promoted the far-
reaching regionalization of regulatory complexes (Verweijen and Van Meeteren 
2015). The weakening of central state regulatory capacities and the devastations 
caused by warfare provided in turn a new impetus for neoliberalism-driven 
transformations. They justified the de-facto privatization of Virunga’s management, 
which led to the profound transnationalization of regulatory authority (Marijnen 
2018). Ironically, the policies of the new park management further weaken central 
state authority over the park and intensify instability. In particular the military 
operations promoted by the park to push out armed groups have aggravated conflicts 
and violence (Verweijen and Marijnen 2018), creating a seeming justification for yet 
more market-oriented interventions, such as the commodification of park rangers’ law 
enforcement activities (Marijnen and Verweijen 2016). This situation illustrates how 
the “collateral damage” caused by neoliberalization can “provide a positive spur to 
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regulatory reinvention”(Peck and Tickell 2002: 392), causing its harmful effects to 
become the conditions for its own reproduction. 
 While transnational actors’ salience circumscribes the room for maneuver of 
Virunga’s inhabitants due to the asymmetry of the underlying power relations, it also 
furthers the pluralization of Virunga’s political forests, which ultimately enhances 
people’s space for contention. On the one hand, the presence of a plurality of political 
forests complicates charting paths of action, as it forces social agents to navigate 
between, cope with and adapt to multiple, often transitory regulatory regimes and 
actors. On the other hand, the pluralization of political forests enlarges forest 
dwellers’ scope for contention, allowing them to make use of the interstices between 
different forests. The overlapping and conflicting nature of Virunga’s diverse political 
forests, and their multi-scalar and networked character, allows their inhabitants to 
jump scales, play off competing factions, and resist meanings and regulations 
propelled by powerful actors, such as the central state and transnational agencies. The 
fragmented nature and uneven salience of stateness play a crucial role in producing 
these spaces of contention. Had we not systematically explored these differential 
articulations of stateness, by examining the socio-spatial relations productive of 
political forests in all their variety, these spaces would not have come fully into view. 
It follows that recognizing and exploring the polymorphy political forests is 
indispensable for understanding the ways in which both “stateness” and 
“neoliberalization” are contested and co-produced in locally specific ways, with 
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